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The Patentability of Electromagnetic and
Acoustic Signals in Canada
Natalie Raffoul*
INTRODUCTION
The Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO) issued a moratorium on
electromagnetic and acoustic signal claims at the beginning of 2007. CIPO wanted
to review international practices and decisions with a view to deciding whether
electromagnetic and acoustic signals constitute patentable subject matter. In August
of 2007, a Practice Notice settled the question.1 CIPO decided that electromagnetic
and acoustic signals are not patentable subject matter within the meaning of “inven-
tion” in s. 2 of the Patent Act.
* J.D., Queen’s; B. Eng. (Electrical), University of Western Ontario. Partner with the
firm of Brion Raffoul. Registered Canadian and U.S. patent agent. The author would
like to thank Professor Bita Amani for her helpful insights and for supervising this
research.
1 Canadian Intellectual Property Office, Patent Notices (14 August 2007), online: Cana-
dian Intellectual Property Office <http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/sc_mrksv/cipo/patents/
pt_notice-e.html>. The notice read as follows:
By this notice the Patent Office is formally expressing its position that
electromagnetic and acoustic signals are forms of energy and do not
contain matter even though the signal may be transmitted through a
physical medium. As a result, claims to electromagnetic and acoustic
signals do not constitute statutory subject matter within the meaning of
the definition of invention in section 2 of the Patent Act. More particu-
larly, an electromagnetic or acoustic signal is interpreted to be neither
an ‘art’ nor a ‘process’ because it is not an act or series of acts or
method of operation by which a result or effect is produced by physi-
cal or chemical action. Neither is an electromagnetic or acoustic sig-
nal a ‘machine’, as it is not the mechanical embodiment of any func-
tion or mode of operation designed to accomplish a particular effect,
or a ‘composition of matter’, as it is not a chemical compound, com-
position or substance. An electromagnetic or acoustic signal is taken
not to be itself a material product and, therefore, not a ‘manufacture.’
The position taken in this notice pertains to electromagnetic and
acoustic signals per se and does not apply to methods, processes, ma-
chines or manufactures involved in the generation, transmission, re-
ception, or processing of signals. The practice expressed in this notice
is effective immediately, and supersedes any previously communicated
practices related to the patentability of signals.
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Since no Canadian case was before the Patent Appeal Board or the courts, it
appears that CIPO simply followed the lead of the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (USPTO). In November of 2005, the USPTO stated in its Interim
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligi-
bility that an electromagnetic signal could not be patented because it was neither a
composition of matter nor a manufacture.2 The USPTO defined manufacture as
relating to“structural entities”, relying on the definition of manufacture enunciated
by the U.S. Supreme Court in Chakrabarty.3
The U.S. Court of Appeals finally shut the door on the patentability of electro-
magnetic and acoustic signals in its September 2007 decision in Nuijten.4 Although
a strong dissent argued that a signal did fall within the patentable subject matter
category of manufacture, the majority held that it did not. Further, the majority
clarified that a signal did not fall within any of the statutory patentable subject
matter categories. A petition for a rehearing en banc failed in 2008.
The issue of the patentability of electromagnetic and acoustic signals has not
been litigated in Canada. If, however, the issue does come forward for litigation,
Canadian courts may decide differently than their American colleagues did. The
Supreme Court of Canada’s ‘Harvard Mouse’ decision shows that the Canadian law
on patentable subject matter differs from American law. Under the Canadian defi-
nition of manufacture, electromagnetic and acoustic signals could constitute patent-
able subject matter.
I. SCIENTIFIC DEFINITIONS OF ELECTROMAGNETIC AND
ACOUSTIC SIGNALS
Signals are an integral part of our daily lives. They allow people who are
physically far removed from one another to converse on mobile phones. Signals
can stream a live performance in real time into a television set thousands of miles
away. But what exactly are they?
Most of us have a general understanding of what a signal is. Webster’s New
Collegiate Dictionary defines signal as “a detectable physical quantity or impulse
(as a voltage, current or magnetic field strength) by which messages or information
can be transmitted.”5 A signal is thus physical, detectable and quantifiable. But,
Webster’s definition also presupposes the presence of coherent intelligence. A sig-
2 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Interim Guidelines for Examination of Pat-
ent Applications for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, (22 November 2005) at Annex
IV, part (c), online: United States Patent and Trademark Office
<http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2005/week47/patgupa.htm>.
3 Ibid.; Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (U.S., 1980) (in which the U.S. Supreme
Court decided that a living, human-made (genetically modified) micro-organism is pat-
entable subject matter as a manufacture or composition of matter within the meaning of
the U.S. Patent Act, s. 101) [Chakrabarty].
4 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (C.A.Fed., 2007) [Nuijten].
5 Henry Bosley Woolf, ed., Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (Toronto: Thomas Al-
len & Son Limited, 1980) s.v. “signal” [Webster’s].
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nal occurs when a sender transmits information to a recipient. What follows is an
examination of how signals, particularly electromagnetic and acoustic signals, are
understood by the scientific and legal community.
(a) Electromagnetic Signals
Electromagnetic signals have been defined as electromagnetic radiation in
which associated electric and magnetic field oscillations are propagated through
space.6 Electromagnetic radiation is a series of electromagnetic waves “that are
propagated by simultaneous periodic variations of electric and magnetic field inten-
sity, and that include radio waves, infrared, visible light, X rays, and gamma rays.”7
An electromagnetic wave thus consists of a changing electric field and a changing
magnetic field.8 It can exist independently because the changing electric field pro-
duces the magnetic field and vice versa.9 The wave’s energy flows back and forth
between the two fields as it travels through space at the speed of light.10 An elec-
tromagnetic signal is simply an electromagnetic wave that has been altered in such
a way that allows it to convey information.
But how is an electromagnetic wave constituted physically? The Standard
Model describes all known particles and the forces that act between them.11 All
material things are constructions of particles,12and forces are the exchange of parti-
cles. Electromagnetic interactions are forces.13Photons are particles associated with
forces.14
Photons are elementary particles, meaning they have no further constituent el-
ements.15 Photons are distinguished from other elementary particles, such as quarks
and leptons, by a number of physical qualities.16 Quarks, for example, have a spe-
cific mass whereas photons do not.17 Furthermore, one of the fundamental proper-
6 Valerie Illingworth, ed., The Penguin Dictionary of Physics (London: Longman Group
Ltd., 1991) at 140 [Dictionary of Physics].
7 Webster’s, supra note 5 at 363.
8 Louis A. Bloomfield, How Things Work, the Physics of Everyday Life (New York:
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1996) at 494 [Bloomfield].
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Martinus Veltman, Facts and Mysteries in Elementary Particle Physics (Singapore:
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 2003) at 35 [Veltman].
12 Ibid. at 38.
13 Ibid. at 53.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. at 55.
16 Ibid. at 58.
17 Ibid. at 38.
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ties of elementary particles is spin.18 It can be defined as an internal rotation, like
the rotation of a spinning ball. Spin can also be quantized.19
Photons have other physical properties. They travel at the speed of light and
have a specific momentum.20 Although a photon has no electric charge and has an
extremely small, almost negligible mass, it can still interact with any particle that
carries a charge.21 And all non-elementary particles are capable of emitting or ab-
sorbing photons.22
Under the Standard Model, electromagnetic waves consist of photons.23 The
idea of an electromagnetic field can be related to the notion of particles.24 In the
same way that light is a collection of photons, an electric field surrounding a
charged object is a collection of photons (although these photons are subtly differ-
ent from those of light).25 A force, then, is an exchange of particles.26 Particles
with electric charge will interact with electromagnetic fields and thus with pho-
tons.27 Radio waves consist of electrons that run up and down a transmitter’s an-
tenna, which emits photons that travel through space and act on the charge in the
receiver’s antenna.28
In returning to the question of how an electromagnetic wave is constituted
physically, the answer is simple; an electromagnetic wave is a physical entity com-
prised of elementary particles known as photons, which can be organized in pat-
terns. Although alterations in patterning are transient in nature and occur rapidly,
they are nevertheless measurable and quantifiable enough to allow a recipient to
interpret them as signals.
(b) Electrical Signals
It is useful to define electrical signals since the majority of the court in Nuijten
refers to them. Electrical signals are electrical currents created through charges
(electrons) in motion. Electrons are negatively charged particles that form clouds
around the nucleus of an atom. The nucleus itself consists of positively charged
protons and neutral neutrons. An ion is an atom or molecule that has lost or gained
18 Ibid. at 55.
19 Ibid.
20 Dictionary of Physics, supra note 6 at 350.
21 Ibid. at 53, 76.
22 Veltman, supra note 11 at 53.
23 Ibid. at 70.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid. at 53, 76.
27 Ibid. at 73.
28 Veltman, supra note 11 at 76; See Bloomfield, supra note 8 at 494.
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one or more electrons.29 A charge arises from an excess or deficit of negative elec-
trons in relation to positive protons.30
Contact between two materials causes them to become charged such that elec-
trons are transferred from one material to the other. Rubbing the materials together
simply enhances the effect.31 The transfer of electrons leaves a net positive charge
on one body and a net negative charge on the other. Charge is a property.32 It is
neither created nor destroyed; it is simply transferred.33 “When a net charge is ad-
ded to a conductor, an electric field will be temporarily established in the body of
the conductor.”34 The free electrons then redistribute themselves and, within a frac-
tion of a second, the internal electric field will vanish.35 An electrical current is the
rate of flow of free electrons through a conductive surface.36 When an electrical
current is varied between a sender and a receiver, an electrical signal is created.
(c) Acoustic Signals
Acoustic signals are made up of acoustic waves.37 Acoustic waves are synon-
ymous with sound waves. Any wave can be characterized as a “disturbance . . .
travelling through a medium.”38 An acoustic wave in particular is defined as a
wave “that is transmitted through a solid, liquid, or gas as a result of mechanical
vibrations of the particles in the medium.”39 The vibrating particles move parallel
to the direction of the wave. The wave itself is a pattern of compressions and
rarefractions of the medium that travel at the speed of sound.40 When sound waves
pass through the ear, air pressure within the ear fluctuates up and down. These
fluctuations are heard as sound.41 While these pressure waves do not alter the com-
position of matter, they do alter the angle of the bonds between the atoms that form
the matter. The bonds are either shortened or lengthened in response to the acoustic
29 Harris Benson, ed., University Physics (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1991) at
433 [Benson].
30 John Daintith, Ph.D., ed., The Facts on File Dictionary of Physics, 2d ed. (New York:
Facts on File, Inc., 1988) at 31.
31 Ibid. at 434.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. at 435.
34 Benson, supra note 29 at 473.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid. at 524.
37 Dictionary of Physics, supra note 6 at 6.
38 Ibid. at 518.
39 Ibid. at 6.
40 Bloomfield, supra note 8 at 347.
41 Ibid.
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wave pattern. An acoustic signal is thus a specific acoustic wave pattern that is
embodied in physical matter.42
Finally, the issue of whether electromagnetic and acoustic signals can arise
naturally or whether they are always man-made should be addressed. A natural
phenomenon can create an electromagnetic wave. But such a phenomenon cannot
alter the field in such a way as to produce a coherent message. Likewise, a natural
phenomenon can create an acoustic wave; but, again, the phenomenon cannot pro-
duce a coherent message. Take the example of radio waves. A radio station can
emit a single musical note or broadcast an entire song, whereas a natural source of
radio waves can only produce a non-refined sound, such as the sound of a waterfall.
That is because there is no intelligence behind the naturally created wave. The nat-
ural source’s output does not signal a coherent message to a recipient. The conclu-
sion is that signals, whether electromagnetic or acoustic, are man-made.
II. LEGAL DEFINITIONS OF PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Section 2 of the Canadian Patent Act43 defines invention by enumerating cate-
gories: “any new and useful art, process, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement in any art, process, machine, manufac-
ture or composition of matter. . . .”44 This definition finds its roots in the U.S. defi-
nition, which defines invention as “any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. . . .”45
The Canadian statutory definition provides for five categories of patentable subject
matter: (1) art, (2) process, (3) machine, (4) manufacture, and (5) composition of
matter.
The Canadian Patent Act, however, excludes specific subject matter from the
s. 2 definition of invention. The Patent Act provides that “no patent shall be granted
for any mere scientific principle or abstract theorem.”46 Courts have interpreted
this provision to mean that there is a distinction between a discovery of a natural
phenomenon and something involving the application of human ingenuity.47 One
cannot patent science, math, or computer programs, per se;48 for example, the fa-
mous E=mc2 equation is not patentable. Rather, the application of principles and
theorems as an art, process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter is
patentable. Mathematical equations may form part of a patentable claim, provided
42 Ibid.
43 Patent Act, R.S.C. 1985, P-4, s. 2 [Patent Act].
44 Ibid. at s. 2.
45 U.S. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101.
46 Patent Act, supra note 45 at s. 27(8).
47 Harvard College v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), 2002 SCC 76, [2002] 4 S.C.R.
45 (S.C.C.) at para. 46-7 [Harvard].
48 Schlumberger Ltd. v. Canada (Patent Commissioner), 56 C.P.R. (2d) 204 (Fed. C.A.,
1998); leave to appeal refused (1981), 1981 CarswellNat 815 (S.C.C.) [Schlumberger].
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the equation is part of a tangible medium, like a machine.49 The U.S. applies a
similar limitation, known as the “mere principles” doctrine (nature, scientific prin-
ciples, and abstract ideas).50 The U.S. Supreme Court applied that doctrine in
Gottschalk v. Benson to find that a method for converting binary-coded decimal
numbers into pure binary numbers was merely a mathematical formula and thus
unpatentable.51
In light of the above discussion of what constitutes electromagnetic and acous-
tic signals, and what constitutes patentable subject matter, we can conclude that
these types of signals are neither a mere scientific principle nor an art, process, or
machine. Furthermore, given the Supreme Court of Canada’s definition of a com-
position of matter as “[a] substance or preparation formed by combination or mix-
ture of various ingredients”,52 these signals cannot be deemed a composition of
matter. The remainder of this article will examine whether electromagnetic and
acoustic signals fall within the category of manufacture.
(a) Definition of Manufacture in the Canadian Jurisprudence
Early on, in the common law patent jurisprudence, manufacture was defined
as “something made by the hands of man”,53 meaning whatever is made by the
hands of man or by man-made devices or machinery. In 1970, a Canadian court
stated that “[m]anufacture connotes the making of something. It accomplishes
some change in the character or condition of material objects.”54
The 2002 Supreme Court of Canada decision, in Harvard College v. Canada,
clarified the definitions of invention, composition of matter and manufacture under
s. 2 of the Patent Act.55 In Harvard, the respondent and patentee, Harvard College,
sought product claims on a non-human mammal, an oncomouse. The oncomouse
was a genetically altered mouse that contained a patentable gene, known as the
oncogene. The issue before the Court was whether higher life forms were a patenta-
ble invention under the Patent Act.
49 See: Motorola Inc. Patent Application No. 2,047,731, Re (1998), 86 C.P.R. (3d) 76
(Can. Pat. App. Bd. & Pat. Commr.) (in which the Patent Appeal Board found that a
machine that performed certain calculations is not merely a mathematical algorithm but
rather a machine specifically adapted to carry out the method of solving the algorithm;
Compare: Schlumberger, supra note 49 (which suggests that claiming Motorola’s
mathematical algorithm as a process is unpatentable).
50 Sam S. Han, Ph.D., “Analyzing the Patentability of ‘Intangible’ Yet ‘Physical’ Subject
Matter” (2002) 3 Colum. Sci & Tech. L. Rev. 2 at 29 [Han].
51 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (U.S. Cust. & Pat. App., 1972).
52 Harvard, supra note 47 at para. 162.
53 Hornblower v. Boulton (1799), 8 Term Rep. 95, 101 E.R. 1285 (Eng. K.B.).
54 Lawson v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents) (1970), 62 C.P.R. 101 (Can. Ex. Ct.) at
111 Cattanch J.
55 Harvard, supra note 47.
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The Supreme Court held that higher life forms, such as animals, are not pat-
entable inventions. The Court reasoned that higher life forms qualify as neither a
patentable composition of matter, nor a patentable manufacture. The Court also up-
held the distinction as to patentability between lower life forms, such as micro-
organisms, and higher life forms, such as plants or animals. Specifically, the Court
stated that the patentability of lower life forms is justifiable because “micro-orga-
nisms are produced ‘en masse as chemical compounds are prepared, and are formed
in such large numbers that any measurable quantity will possess uniform properties
and characteristics’”;56 the same cannot be said for higher life forms. The Supreme
Court, however, reserved its decision as to whether lower life forms constitute a
composition of matter or a manufacture.57
While the Harvard decision revolved around living matter, the definitions
given by the Court to composition of matter and manufacture are still very much
applicable when analyzing non-living matter, such as an electromagnetic signal.
The majority made clear that an invention is not “anything under the sun made by
man”,58 but that “Parliament chose to adopt an exhaustive definition that limits
invention to any ‘art, process, machine, or composition of matter.’”59 The majority
explicitly stated that “Parliament did not define ‘invention’ as ‘anything new and
useful made by man.’”60 The majority also found that Parliament chose the defini-
tion of invention to expressly include certain subject matter as patentable while
excluding other subject matter as being non-statutory subject matter.61
In its discussion of patentable subject matter categories, the majority defined
the meaning of manufacture after a review of various definitions:
With respect to the meaning of the word “manufacture” (fabrication), al-
though it may be attributed a very broad meaning, I am of the opinion that
the word would commonly be understood to denote a non-living mechanis-
tic product or process. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary . . . de-
fines the noun “manufacture” as the following:
The action or process of making by hand. . . . The action or
process of making articles or material (in modern use, on a
large scale) by the application of physical labour or
mechanical power.
The Grand Robert de la langue française . . . defines thus the word
“fabrication”:
[TRANSLATION] Art or action or manufacturing . . . The
manufacture of a technical object (by someone). Manufac-
56 Ibid. at para. 200, quoting Abitibi Co., Re (1982), 62 C.P.R. (2d) 81 (Can. Pat. App.
Bd. & Pat. Commr), at 89. Commr.).
57 Ibid. at para. 201, referencing Chakrabarty, supra note 3.
58 Ibid. at para. 158, referencing Chakrabarty, supra note 3.
59 Ibid. at para. 158.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
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turing by artisans, by hand, by machine, industrially, by
mass production. . . .
In Chakrabarty, supra, at p. 308, “manufacture” was defined as
the production of articles for use from raw or prepared
materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities,
properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by
machinery.
These definitions use the terminology of “article”, “material,” and “objet
technique.” Is a mouse an “article”, “material”, or an “objet technique”? In
my view, while a mouse may be analogized to a “manufacture” when it is
produced in an industrial setting, the word in its vernacular sense does not
include a higher life form. The definition in Hornblower v. Boulton
(1799). . . cited by the respondent, is equally problematic when applied to
higher life forms. In that case, the English courts defined “manufacture” as
“something made by the hands of man” (p. 1288). In my opinion, a complex
life form such as a mouse or a chimpanzee cannot easily be characterized as
“something made by the hands of man.”62
The majority held that manufacture should be defined, with a view to common
understanding, as a non-living mechanistic product or process.63 The meaning of
non-living hangs on the majority’s assertion that “[t]he words ‘machine’ and ‘man-
ufacture’ do not imply a conscious, sentient, living creature”64 and that higher life
forms cannot be easily characterized as something made by the hands of man.65
Under its definition, the majority held that a mammal was not a manufacture.
Therefore, it can be inferred that the non-living part of the definition excludes liv-
ing creatures from the category of manufacture even if they happen to be man-
made. The meaning of mechanistic product or process, in the definition, can be
expanded as well. A mechanistic product or process is one that has new forms,
qualities, properties or combinations thereof, and is man-made. It appears that the
Supreme Court’s definition of manufacture as a non-living mechanistic product or
process means a non-living product or process that has new forms, qualities,
properties, or combinations thereof, and is man-made. This definition will be use-
ful later during our analysis of whether electromagnetic and acoustic signals fit
within the definition of manufacture.
There was, however, a strong dissenting view in Harvard. Binnie J. (along
with McLachlin J., Major J., and Arbour J.) criticized the majority for taking too
limiting a view of the word manufacture.66 Binnie J. suggests that the courts should
take “the expansionist view that has characterized patent jurisprudence to date.”67
62 Ibid. at para. 159 [emphasis added in bold].
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. at para. 161.
65 Ibid. at para. 159.
66 Ibid. at para. 58.
67 Ibid. at para. 58.
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Binnie J. refers to Godson on Patents (2nd ed.), in which it is noted that the word
manufacture has received “very extended signification” from the courts.68 Moreo-
ver, Binnie J. writes that “the definition of invention should be read as a whole and
expansively with a view to giving protection to what is novel and unobvious.”69
Binnie J.’s comments suggest that he endorses the U.S. Supreme Court’s expansive
view of invention in Chakrabarty as “anything under the sun made by man.”
Interestingly, in its 2004 decision in Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, the
Supreme Court of Canada, with a changed bench, altered its course from the
Harvard decision to extend patentee rights to plants as higher life forms.70 The
Monsanto decision is noteworthy for its discussion about whether the transient or
disappearing nature of subject matter excludes it as patentable. The Court said this
about the transient nature of life forms: “Further, all members of the Court in
Harvard Mouse noted in obiter that a fertilized, genetically altered oncomouse egg
would be patentable subject matter, regardless of its ultimate anticipated develop-
ment into a mouse.”71 Binnie J., in Harvard, had expressly stated that “a ‘disap-
pearing subject-matter’ exception finds no support in the statutory language.”72 It
can thus be concluded that subject matter is not excluded from patentability based
on its eventual disappearance, or transient nature; i.e., there is no disappearing sub-
ject matter exception in Canadian patent law.
This is an important clarification by the Court because electromagnetic and
acoustic signals are transient in nature, and yet the Supreme Court’s statement
makes clear that transience is not cause for excluding subject matter from patent-
ing. As discussed earlier, electromagnetic signals are essentially photons that move
at the speed of light. Similarly, acoustic signals are compressions and rarefractions
of particles that travel at the speed of sound. These signals only last momentarily.
In Nuijten, the majority of the U.S. Court of Appeals seems to have excluded elec-
tromagnetic signals from patenting based on their transient nature, explaining that
the “energy embodying the claimed signal is fleeting and is devoid of any sem-
blance of permanence during transmission.”73 This is an important jurisdictional
distinction that CIPO may not have picked up on before issuing its 2007 Practice
Notice on the patentability of electromagnetic and acoustic signals.
Unfortunately, there has been no judicial pronouncement as to whether claims
to electromagnetic and acoustic signals are patentable. CIPO, in consultation with
the Canadian patent bar had, however, authored some guidelines on point prior to
issuing its negative Practice Notice in 2007. These are found in the Manual of Pat-
ent Office Practice (MOPOP), as authored and continually updated by CIPO. MO-
68 Ibid. at para. 57.
69 Ibid. at para. 59.
70 Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, 2004 SCC 34, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (S.C.C.)
[Monsanto].
71 Ibid. at para. 23.
72 Harvard, supra note 47 at para. 3.
73 Nuijten, supra note 4 at 16.
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POP defines manufacture as “the process of making articles or material (in modern
use on a large scale) by the application of physical labour or mechanical power, or
the article or material made by such a process; excludes higher life forms.”74 MO-
POP’s definition is in keeping with the one provided in Harvard (i.e., a non-living
mechanistic product or process) because the phrase the application of physical la-
bour or mechanical power simply means something that is man-made. Thus, the
MOPOP definition is also a helpful guide.
MOPOP’s Chapter 16, which was revised in 2005, reflected updates in Cana-
dian patent practice regarding computer implemented inventions. To date, MOPOP
still defines three possible subject matter categories for computer implemented in-
ventions: (1) art or process (method) claims; (2) machine (apparatus or system)
claims; and (3) manufacture (products, computer media, including signals embody-
ing code or data structures) claims.75 Furthermore, MOPOP defines manufacture
claims as follows:
[A] computer readable memory storing statements and instructions for exe-
cution by a data processing system to direct the system to function in a par-
ticular manner. This program storage device claim is variously referred to as
a computer readable medium claim, software claim, record carrier claim,
article of manufacture or computer product. The computer product is under-
stood to be a product which is adapted to cooperate with a data processing
system rather than being a product which is produced by the data processing
system.76
MOPOP further explains that a signal claim falls within the manufacture category
and provides an example of a computer program embodied in a signal medium as
follows:
The computer medium may exist in a transitory state of a propagated sig-
nal. The carrier of the computer program is a transmissible carrier in the
following acceptable example.
Example, Claim 6: A carrier wave embodying a computer data signal repre-
senting sequences of statements and instructions which, when executed by a
processor cause the processor to enrol signature information of an author-
ized user onto an identification card, the statements and instructions com-
prising the steps of:
a) collecting samples of a signal at a rate of at least n times a
frequency component of said signal which is to be preserved,
where n is an integer greater than four;
b) digitally filtering said samples representing said signal to re-
move high frequencies; and
74 Manual of Patent Office Practice, s. 12.02.01, online: CIPO <http://www.cipo.gc.ca>
[emphasis added] [MOPOP].
75 Ibid. at s. 16.04.
76 Ibid. at s. 16.04.03.
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c) storing the remaining of the filtered samples on said card.77
The above example Claim 6 is useful in providing a sample signal claim.
Here, the patentee claims a carrier wave (which is an electromagnetic wave) em-
bodying a computer data signal that contains a complex sequence of statements and
instructions for a computer to execute. The statements and instructions are enumer-
ated in steps (a) through (c). However, while MOPOP continues to refer to signals
as patentable subject matter under the manufacture category, it cannot be relied on
as an authority on the subject. Its authority has been undermined by the 2007 Prac-
tice Notice.
At this point it will be helpful to examine the current state of the law on this
issue in the U.S. There have been some recent American judicial decisions on
point.
(b) Definition of Manufacture in the American Jurisprudence
Before reviewing the case law, it is worth noting, again, that the definition of
invention under s. 2 of the Patent Act is very similar to s. 101 of the U.S. patent
statute. Both statutes define invention as any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter. Because Canada and the United States are
considered “like-minded jurisdictions”78 when it comes to issues of patentable sub-
ject matter, and have similar statutory provisions, the American jurisprudence is
helpful in predicting how issues may be decided in Canada.
On 20 September 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit in Nuijten held that a signal did not qualify as a manufacture, and was thus
considered unpatentable subject matter.79 Nuijten’s patent application was directed
to a technique for reducing distortion induced by the introduction of watermarks
(i.e., additional data) into signals. The Court upheld the decision of the U.S.P.T.O.
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. The Board had held that claims directed
to a storage medium having stored thereon a signal with embedded supplemental
data (Claim 15), a method of embedding supplemental data in a signal (Claims
1–10), and an arrangement for embedding supplemental data in a signal (Claims
11–13), were patentable. However, the Board rejected Claim 14 and its dependent
claims as being unpatentable subject matter. These claims were at issue on appeal.
The majority reviewed each statutory subject matter category and found that a
“transitory, propagating signal...is not a ‘process, machine, manufacture, or compo-
sition of matter . . . under 35 U.S.C. § 101.’”80 Thus, Claim 14 and its dependent
were deemed unpatentable on that basis.
77 Ibid. at s. 16.04.03b [emphasis added].
78 Harvard, supra note 47 at para. 38.
79 Nuijten, supra note 4.
80 Ibid. at 18.
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For our purposes, the majority’s analysis of signal Claim 14, under the manu-
facture category, is relevant. Claim 14 in the Nuijten application read as follows:
[a] signal with embedded supplemental data, the signal being encoded in
accordance with a given encoding process and selected samples of the sig-
nal representing protection the supplemental data, and at least one of the
samples preceding the selected samples is different from the sample corre-
sponding to the given encoding process.81
The majority for the Court of Appeals stated that Claim 14 and its dependents cov-
ered “transitory electrical and electromagnetic signals propagating through some
medium, such as wires, air or a vacuum.”82 But, in terms of the breadth of the
claims at issue, the Court of Appeals construed them to mean that “[a]ny tangible
means of information carriage will suffice for all of the claims at issue . . . [and]
some physical form is required, but any form will do, so long as the recipient can
understand the message, the nature of the signal’s physical carrier is totally irrele-
vant to the claims at issue.”83 On a similar claim construction, the Board rejected
the claims as unpatentable subject matter because “[t]he signal does not have any
physical structure or substance and does not fit within the definition of a ‘manufac-
ture’ which requires a tangible object.”84 In other words, Claim 14 was not limited
to a particular signal medium, as it merely provided for an encoded signal.
While it is arguable that the breadth of Claim 14 captured an encoded hand
signal, the analysis by the majority was limited to a more realistic interpretation of
the type of signal contemplated as being an electrical or electromagnetic signal.
The majority conceded that the claimed subject matter was “man-made, in the
sense of having been encoded, generated, and transmitted by artificial means.”85
The Court’s concession here is helpful because it implies that these types of signals
are not capable of being produced by natural phenomena, rather are clearly man-
made.
The majority then relied on the definition of manufacture set out by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Chakrabarty. That Court defined manufacture as the “production
of articles for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new
forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand-labor or by machin-
ery.”86 The majority in Nuijten emphasized the term article within the Chakrabarty
81 Ibid. at 6.
82 Ibid. at 8.
83 Ibid. at 10.
84 Ibid. at 7.
85 Ibid. at 15 [emphasis added].
86 Ibid. quoting Chakrabarty, supra note 3.
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definition to reason that a manufacture must be a tangible article or commodity.87
On that basis, the majority found as follows:
A transient electric or electromagnetic transmission does not fit within that
definition. While such a transmission is man-made and physical — it exists
in the real world and has tangible causes and effects — it is a change in
electric potential that, to be perceived, must be measured at a certain point
in space and time by equipment capable of detecting and interpreting the
signal. In essence, energy embodying the claimed signal is fleeting and is
devoid of any semblance of permanence during transmission. Moreover,
any tangibility arguably attributed to a signal is embodied in the principle
that it is perceptible — e.g., changes in electrical potential can be measured.
All signals within the scope of the claim do not themselves comprise some
tangible article or commodity. This is particularly true when the signal is
encoded on an electromagnetic carrier and transmitted through a vacuum —
a medium that, by definition, is devoid of matter.
We recognize the wave-particle duality as applied to electromagnetic en-
ergy. However, the fact that photons traveling at or near the speed of light
behave in some way like particles does not make them tangible articles.88
The reference to the claimed signal being fleeting or devoid of any semblance of
permanence suggests that the majority read into the Chakrabarty definition a non-
transitory requirement. However, the U.S. Supreme Court did not enumerate such a
limitation in its definition of manufacture. This line of reasoning seems to lack
jurisprudential foundation. Moreover, the statement that the claimed signals are not
a tangible article also seems unfounded. What does it mean to be tangible? Is some-
thing that is measurable and quantifiable not inherently tangible? It would appear
that the statements by the majority are conclusive rather than well reasoned and
based on a sound definition of what a tangible article is. The majority’s com-
ments89 are also unsound because, as discussed previously, photons are elementary
particles. The theory of wave-particle duality speaks to the properties of particles,
such as photons, describing them as having wave-like properties, as well as parti-
cle-like properties. This theory does not negate the fact that particle physicists have
determined that photons are particles, as are quarks, which constitute protons in
atoms. It seems that the majority is discriminating between particles, holding that
some constitute physical matter, while others do not. But the law does not provide
support for such a distinction and neither does science.
Linn J., the lone dissenter in the three-panel Nuijten decision, would likely
agree with these comments as to the majority’s reasoning. Linn J. found that the
signal claims fell within the patentable subject matter category of a manufacture.
87 Ibid. at 16.
88 Ibid. at 16 [emphasis added].
89 Bloomfield, supra note 8
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Linn J. contended that the definition of “manufacture” is not limited to “non-transi-
tory, tangible things.”90 Rather, Linn J. stated as follows:
Claim 14 is directed to a “manufacture” because the signal is, in the broad
sense discussed above, an “article”, “produc[ed] . . . for use from raw or
prepared materials by giving to these materials [a] new form.”. . .Put differ-
ently, it is a product of human “art”, or ingenuity; it is an application of
technology to provoke some purposeful transformation in the real world.
Any contrary conclusion must depend on a too-literal reading of either “arti-
cle” or “material”, neither of which appears in the statute, and neither of
which any precedent — until today — has imposed as a limitation on the
otherwise “expansive” scope of § 101. No matter what form the signal of
Claim 14 may take, it must involve “some physical carrier of information”
that is created or manipulated through human activity, and that physical
carrier must function “to convey information to a recipient” — it must
signal.91
Linn J. points out that there is no non-transitory limitation to articles of manufac-
ture in American jurisprudence. Based on Binnie J.’s comment in Monsanto, there
is likely no such limitation in Canadian patent law either. Furthermore, these types
of signals are man-made, created and manipulated through human activity. Inherent
in the creation of a signal is the requirement of a sender and a recipient who can
understand the medium chosen to signal. Thus, any argument that a natural phe-
nomenon could be responsible for sending these types of signals is unfounded. Linn
J.’s dissenting opinion is quite informative with regard to whether electromagnetic
and acoustic signals should be deemed patentable subject matter in Canada.
Nuijten was not the first American case that confronted the issue of patenting
signal claims. On 20 June 1840, Morse received U.S. Patent No. 1647. In O’Reilly
v. Morse, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the Morse patent and established that
certain things were not appropriate subject matter for patent protection, such as the
laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas.92 The Court held that “the
discovery of a principle in natural philosophy or physical science is not patenta-
ble.”93 However, the Court upheld the following structural signal claim: “I claim as
my invention, the system of signs, consisting of dots, spaces, and horizontal lines,
for numerals, letters, words, or sentences, substantially as herein set forth and illus-
trated, for telegraphic purposes.”94 While the claim reads much like a system claim,
the system itself is nothing more than signals (i.e., dots, spaces, and horizontal
lines) that are being used to communicate messages. The U.S. Supreme Court, at
that time, was persuaded that signals were not a principle of physical science, but
rather the production of a “useful result.”95
90 Nuijten, supra note 4 at 2 [Linn J. concurring in part and dissenting in part].
91 Ibid. at 19 [emphasis added].
92 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (U.S., 1853).
93 Ibid. at 116.
94 Ibid. at 85.
95 Ibid. at 119.
140   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [7 C.J.L.T.]
Although other foreign jurisdictions were not thoroughly researched for the
purposes of this article, Europe seems to have taken a different, more generous
view of the patentability of signal claims. Patents claiming signals are being issued
and upheld by the European Technical Board of Appeal, in contrast to their North
American counterparts.96 One European applicant successfully argued before the
board that an electronic message is patentable because it is clearly the product of an
electronic process, which is also patentable.97 In that decision, the Board likened
96 IBM/Computer programs (T935/97), [1999] E.P.O.R. 301 (EPO (Technical Bd App),
1999) (in which the Board ruled that there are many ways to form a claim for a com-
puter program product and that it is not important whether the program is claimed
alone, or stored through the means of, or in the form of a signal; i.e. a program stored
on disk as a file, or a program transmitted through the internet; the Board stated that
“the computer program product comprises a computer-readable medium on which the
program is stored, this medium only constitutes the physical support on which the pro-
gram is saved, and thus constitutes hardware”). See also Jean Hughes, Patentability of
software, comment in IBM/Computer programs Technical Board of Appeal (T935/97),
[1999] E.I.P.R. N-161[RNF].
97 LUCENT/Structured voicemail messages (T858/02) (2005), [2006] E.P.O.R. 6 (EPO
(Technical Bd. App.), 2005) (in which the Board of Appeal states:
IV. The single independent claim 1 reads as follows:
An electronic message comprising: a plurality of mes-
saging elements, at least one of the messaging ele-
ments being associated with at least a portion of the
content of the message and at least one of the messag-
ing elements comprising instructions that define a
structure of the message; and an address of a recipient
of the message on a messaging system that stores the
message and is capable of interpreting the instruc-
tions, assembling the content-related messaging ele-
ments in accordance with the instructions, and
presenting the assembled message to the recipient
when the recipient retrieves the message from storage.
. . . . .
Reasons for the Decision
5.1 — The objection under Art.84 EPC
The Examining Division gave Art.84 EPC as its first ground for
refusing the application. It would appear that the fundamental
objection was that the term ‘message’ defined neither a physical
entity such as a product or apparatus nor an activity such as a
method or process, these being the only allowable categories of
patent claim. It was not explained how this objection arose from
Art.84 EPC. The Board notes that the decision of the Enlarged
Board of Appeal G2/88 . . . distinguishes two basic types of
claim, namely claims to physical entities and claims to physical
activities, at point 2.2, although it goes on to point out that
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the electronic message to a television signal which had earlier been held patentable
by the Board.98 The success of the product by patentable process argument in the
European forum is interesting. One could similarly argue in the Canadian context
that if the process by which the signal is made is patentable subject matter, so too is
the resultant product of that process.
III. ANALYSIS OF SIGNALS AS A MANUFACTURE
Recall the Supreme Court of Canada’s definition of manufacture as a non-
living mechanistic product or process. This definition can be parsed to mean non-
living product or process that has new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations
thereof and is man-made.99 As signals are the product of a process of encoding
claims including both features relating to physical activities and
features relating to physical entities are also possible, and that
there are no rigid lines of demarcation between the various possi-
ble forms of claims. . . . Article 84 is further mentioned in G
2/88, . . . but only to say that physical entities must be defined in
terms of physical parameters of the entity, and physical activities
must be defined in terms of their physical steps. . . . The Examin-
ing Division considered that a ‘message’ related to the communi-
cation between two entities, and that such a communication
could not be considered as a physical entity but rather related
exclusively to the information content, which was non-physical
information of an essentially abstract character. But when con-
sidering the nature or category of a claimed invention attention
must be paid to the substance of what is claimed, rather than only
taking into account how the claimed subject-matter is designated,
which can be deceptive. In the Board’s view the content of the
information in the message, in the sense used by the examination
division, is not claimed. It is commonplace that the same word
may be used both for the physical realisation of some informa-
tion and its content, in the sense of what is understood by its
recipient (consider the word ‘film’). Thus, whereas the term
‘message’ may in some contexts refer merely to the information
it is intended to convey (‘The message of ‘Don Quixote’ is . . .’),
when qualified by the term ‘electronic’ the natural meaning re-
fers to its physical realisation. An electronic message is an elec-
trical, magnetic or electromagnetic signal or collection of signals
and moreover clearly the product of an electronic process. This
conclusion is congruent with the decision . . . to grant a patent
containing a claim directed to a ‘colour television signal.’ . . .
Thus, the Board concludes that the Examining Division’s rejec-
tion of the application under Art.84 EPC was not well-founded).
98 Ibid.
99 Harvard, supra note 47.
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information into some medium, we can eliminate the term process from further
analysis.
(a) A Product with New Forms, Qualities, or Properties
As previously explained, electromagnetic signals are photons that take on a
specific form to communicate a message. While a photon can be distinguished from
other particles based on its properties, it is no less a particle. It is true that photons
do not form parts of objects, like chairs and tables. This job is reserved for other
particles such as neutrons and protons. However, it seems that authorities on this
subject are making an arbitrary distinction between particles. For example, the
Court in Nuijten classified some particles as matter while excluding others such as
photons as non-matter, even though a photon has physical characteristics that are
measurable. Electromagnetic signals (photons) are products that are produced by a
man-made process and have specific measurable forms, qualities, and properties.
The Court in Nuijten also suggested that an article of manufacture needs mass;
however, this requirement is not part of the Chakrabarty definition. The fact that
photons essentially have no mass does not change the fact that they possess other
physical properties, such as momentum and the ability to interact with other matter
and cause it to be disturbed in some way.
CIPO, in its 2007 Practice Notice, seems to take a view similar to the major-
ity’s in Nuijten. CIPO also added a new qualifier to the definition of manufacture
with its statement that electromagnetic signals are not in themselves material prod-
ucts. This qualifier is not found in the Supreme Court’s definition of manufacture.
Rather, the Supreme Court refers to mechanistic products or processes, not material
products or processes. As such, CIPO’s position is tenuous.
Similar arguments may be made vis-à-vis acoustic signals. These signals man-
ifest themselves physically as vibrations of particles in a particular medium. While
acoustic signals are fleeting, the compression and rarefaction of the particles mech-
anistically change the form of the medium. Thus, this detectable and measurable
form is a mechanistic product.
(b) Non-Living and Made by the Hands of Man
Electromagnetic signals (i.e., photons) clearly do not constitute living matter.
Although electromagnetic or acoustic waves can be created by a natural phenome-
non, such waves are disturbances100 that do not signal information. Rather, signals
that carry information from a sender to a recipient can only be man-made. Thus,
one must distinguish electromagnetic signals created by man from electromagnetic
waves, which may or may not be created by man. Moreover, applicants who have
sought to claim a signal have expressly limited the claim by referring to a signal.
For example, Claim 6 from MOPOP’s Chapter 16 clearly refers to a signal, as does
Nuijten’s Claim 14.
100 Dictionary of Physics, supra note 6 at 518.
PATENTABILITY OF ELECTROMAGNETIC & ACOUSTIC SIGNALS   143
(c) Analogous to Computer Readable Media Claims
A concern with CIPO’s rejection of signals as patentable subject matter is that
the rejection is based on form rather than substance. Computer readable media
claims are considered patentable subject matter under the s. 2 definition of inven-
tive subject matter of the Patent Act. MOPOP’s Chapter 16 provides that a com-
puter implemented invention may be a patentable manufacture if claimed as a com-
puter readable claim, provided the claim recites “the material or physical medium
in a positive manner, storing or embodying the computer readable code of the com-
puter program for execution in the computer.”101 For example, a signal carrying
computer readable code is patentable subject matter, provided it is claimed as
stored on a physical medium, such as “computer readable memory”102 or as a
“computer product.”103
However, claiming a signal as embodied in a computer readable memory, adds
nothing inventive to the subject matter. Rather, it merely forces the patent applicant
to pigeon hole his or her invention into a certain claim form in order to get patent
protection. Yet, electromagnetic signals are essentially a type of computer readable
media: they can be read by computers upon receipt. As such, by not permitting
claims to signals, it seems that CIPO is favouring a form over substance approach
in that there is no substantive difference between claiming a signal and computer
readable memory storing that same signal. Electromagnetic signals should, in fact,
be considered a patentable manufacture, given the patentability of other similar
forms of computer readable media.
The U.S. also appears to take a similar form over substance stance regarding
the patentability of computer readable media versus that of signals. The Court in
the In re Beauregard decision held that signals embodied in a tangible medium
constitute patentable subject matter.104
(d) Relative Importance of Signal Claims
Signals may be protected as patentable subject matter if claimed as computer
readable media. There is unique enforcement and jurisdictional consideration
granted to signal claims. This makes the securing of a claim quite valuable to a
patentee.
However, enforcement may be feeble if the signal claim is not in place; it may
be difficult for a patent owner to try to enforce a claim on the process of generating
a signal when a pirate infringes the process.105 On the other hand, to enforce a
101 MOPOP, supra note 74 at s. 16.04.03a.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
104 In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (C.A. Fed., 1995).
105 Richard H. Stern, “Patenting Signals” (March/April 1998) IEEE Micro 6 at 8.
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secured signal claim, a patent owner need only show the transmission of the in-
fringing signal.106
To highlight jurisdictional considerations, the following hypothetical scenario
may be helpful. Suppose a valid Canadian patent claims a computer readable mem-
ory embodying a novel signal. Also, imagine that there is no equivalent U.S. patent.
Now, a U.S. company decides to use the signal patented in Canada throughout the
U.S. Of course, because there is no U.S. patent, the U.S. company is free to do so.
However, the signal claimed in the Canadian patent is being clearly transmitted
from Detroit to Windsor. Windsor residents are therefore taking advantage of the
signal. To enforce its claim against the pirates, the Canadian patentee would be
required to prove that individual Windsor residents are downloading the signal onto
computer readable memory. Suing each resident would likely be very ineffective
and cost prohibitive. Unfortunately, under the current patent scheme, the patent
owner has little choice. Although the Canadian patent owner may be able to sue the
U.S. company for inducing infringement, it may be difficult for the patent owner to
prove that the U.S. company knowingly induced the Windsor residents to infringe
the Canadian patent.107 But, if the patentee had a signal claim, the signal claim
could make the U.S. company a direct infringer rather than an indirect infringer.108
Another benefit to allowing signal claims is that it may reduce the number of
claims currently required to adequately protect the invention.109 Currently, paten-
tees will draft signal claims, as to computer readable memory or to a process for
encoding a signal, in a variety of forms. Referring back to the Nuijten application,
the signal was claimed in three other patentable forms: (1) as a storage medium
having stored thereon a signal with embedded supplemental data (Claim 15), (2) as
a method of embedding supplemental data in a signal (Claims 1–10), and (3) as an
arrangement for embedding supplemental data in a signal (Claims 11–13). Are
these forms of claiming the signal truly necessary, or is it a case of allowing form
to trump substance? Claiming a signal in a storage medium adds nothing to the
inventiveness of the subject matter.
(e) Public Policy Considerations
One concern raised by the Supreme Court in Harvard relates to balancing the
promotion of ingenuity with other competing social considerations.110 In the case
of eclectromagnetic and acoustic signals, patentability does not involve moral con-
siderations of the sort which arise in the patenting of a life form. Signals involve
106 Ibid.
107 See Slater Steel Industries Ltd. v. R. Payer Co. (1968), 55 C.P.R. 61 (Can. Ex. Ct.) (in
which the Court summarizes Canadian law on inducing infringement).
108 See Jeffrey R. Kuester & Scott A. Horstemeyer & Daniel J. Santos, “A New Frontier in
Patents: Patent Claims to Propagated Signals” (1998) 17 J. Marshall J. Computer &
Info. L. 75 at 87.
109 Ibid.
110 Harvard, supra note 47 at para. 185.
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non-living subject matter. As discussed above, they fall readily within the already
patentable subject matter category of computer readable media. Research and de-
velopment in the area of information technology would likely be stimulated if in-
ventors were allowed to patent signal claims because of the added protection that
claims provide to a patentee. Thus, the public policy benefits of promoting ingenu-
ity in this technical field most likely outweigh any potential social concerns.
Also, given that s. 27(3) of the Patent Act was repealed in 1993, (this provi-
sion prohibited patenting of an invention that had “an illicit object in view”), it
would seem that value judgments have no place in assessing patentability.111 If
governments want to regulate particular subject matter, specific legislation should
be enacted to do so. After all, not all invented subject matter is patented. The Pat-
ent Act and CIPO cannot, and should not, be used to regulate whole subject matter
areas. Other government departments are better equipped to do this. With respect to
pharmaceutical patents, for example, Health Canada oversees health and safety
risks related to the sale and use of various consumer products across Canada.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
(a) Han’s Disclosure Test
Sam Han suggests a possible solution to the problem of how to examine pat-
entability of signals.112 Han suggests that the terms new and useful in 35 U.S.C. s.
101 should play a role in the analysis of patentable subject matter. Han advocates a
four-part test, whereby an examiner would perform a sequential review of the
claims by stepping through ss. 101 (which delineates patentable subject matter),
112 (which requires an enabling disclosure for the claimed subject matter), 102
(which requires that the invention be new), and 103 (which requires it to not be
obvious) of the U.S. patent statute.113 Han’s four-part test would undertake the fol-
lowing analysis to determine patentability:
1) According to 35 U.S.C. s. 101 and the Chakrabarty decision, is the
subject matter made by man?
If answered in the negative, the subject matter is considered non-
statutory and thus unpatentable;
If answered in the affirmative, the subject matter is considered statu-
tory; move on to step 2;
2) According to 35 U.S.C. s. 112, is the written disclosure sufficiently
enabling for one of skill in the art to reproduce the subject matter
(e.g., generate such a signal)?
111 See Bita Amani, State Agency and Patenting of Life in International Law: Merchants
and Missionaries in a Global Society (Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing,
Forthcoming August 2009) at 176.
112 Han, supra note 50.
113 Ibid. at 64–73.
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If answered in the negative, the claimed subject matter is not patenta-
ble for insufficient disclosure;
If answered in the affirmative, there is sufficient disclosure; move on
to step 3;
3) According to 35 U.S.C. s. 102, is the subject matter novel?
If answered in the negative, the claimed subject matter is not patenta-
ble;
If answered in the affirmative, move on to step 4;
4) According to 35 U.S.C. s. 103, is the subject matter obvious?
If answered in the affirmative, the claimed subject matter is not pat-
entable;
If answered in the negative, the claimed subject matter is patentable.
In step one, Han does not contemplate pigeon-holing the subject matter into a
specific category like that of composition of matter. Rather, Han suggests that be-
cause “anything under the sun may be manipulated by man to a useful end, every-
thing should be regarded as being within s. 101.”114 Han also suggests that the
“degree of abstraction” (or “abstract” nature) of the claim should be determined
under step two’s 35 U.S.C. s. 112 analysis.115 If the subject matter is too abstract,
the claimed subject matter cannot be reproduced by the skilled artisan. Han is refer-
ring to the exclusion of abstract ideas and mere principles from patenting. While
steps three and four add nothing new to the current analysis, they ensure that the
review of novelty and obviousness requirements are separate from the step one in-
quiry of what is made by man. For example, if a signal contemplated something
already produced by a natural phenomenon or already existing in nature, that signal
could not be patented.
Han’s disclosure test is useful in emphasizing the importance of the disclosure
requirement. Whether the claimed subject matter is too abstract is a determination
that should follow a determination of whether the subject matter is patentable.
(b) A Canadian Disclosure Test for the Manufacture Category
In the Canadian context, a similar disclosure test to that of Han’s could be
applied. However, given the differences in Canadian and American law as to pat-
entable subject matter, step one would need to be modified. In addition, a modified-
Han analysis would need to be reserved for the manufacture category of claims.
114 Ibid. at 64.
115 Ibid.
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The other three steps would remain quite similar. The Canadian analysis could
break down as follows:
1) According to s. 2 of the Patent Act and the Canadian jurisprudence,
does the subject matter involve a non-living product or process made
by the hands of man that has new forms, qualities, properties, or
combinations thereof?
If answered in the negative, the subject matter is considered non-
statutory and thus unpatentable;
If answered in the affirmative, the subject matter is considered statu-
tory; move on to step 2;
2) According to s. 27(3) of the Patent Act, is the written disclosure
sufficiently enabling for one of skill in the art to reproduce the sub-
ject matter (e.g., generate such a signal)?
If answered in the negative, the claimed subject matter is not patenta-
ble for insufficient disclosure;
If answered in the affirmative, there is sufficient disclosure; move on
to step 3;
3) According to s. 28.2 of the Patent Act, is the subject matter novel?
If answered in the negative, the claimed subject matter is not patenta-
ble;
If answered in the affirmative, move on to step 4;
4) According to s. 28.3 of the Patent Act, is the subject matter obvious?
If answered in the affirmative, the claimed subject matter is not pat-
entable;
If answered in the negative, the claimed subject matter is patentable.
The above analysis conforms to the recent jurisprudential statements on pat-
entable subject matter. It appears that CIPO did not follow this type of analysis.
The Supreme Court in Harvard states that a manufacture is a non-living mechanis-
tic product. CIPO has injected a new and troublesome requirement into the defini-
tion of manufacture by adding the term material before product in its Practice No-
tice to draw its conclusion that an electromagnetic signal is not a manufacture.
CONCLUSION
The author concludes that electromagnetic and acoustic signals are patentable
subject matter under the manufacture category. This conclusion is based on the au-
thor’s finding that the legal definition of manufacture encompasses the scientific
definitions of electromagnetic and acoustic signals. Should this conclusion be
adopted in Canada, the four-part analysis recommended above would provide a
helpful guide to courts and patent office examiners in analyzing this type of patent-
able subject matter for patentability. 
